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Abstract
This paper investigates the reasons why African farmers who face similar ﬁnan-
cial constraints, market environments and agro-ecological conditions diﬀer in their
chemical fertilizer use behaviors. We analyze the inﬂuence of individual preferences
on fertilizer use. We model the fertilizer investment decision of a farmer : the model
predicts that the quantity of fertilizer used is an increasing function of discounting.
We then empirically test the empirical relevance of such a model, building upon
an agricultural survey that we conducted on 1277 maize producers in the Mouhoun
and Tuy provinces of Burkina Faso and upon an ﬁeld experiment we led to elicit
their risk aversion and discounting. Controlling for individual ﬁnancial constraints
and access to fertilizer, we show that experimental choices about time preferences
correlate with observed fertilizer use behavior. This paper presents one of the the
ﬁrst ﬁeld evidence that links hypothetical time discount questions to observed agri-
cultural decisions.
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1 Introduction
In the last forty years, cereals yields rose signiﬁcantly in most developing countries, but
Sub-Saharan Africa has not participated to such an agricultural success (World Bank,
2008). Yields have reached an average of ﬁve tons per hectare in Eastern Asia while
they maintain themselves around one ton per hectare in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAOSTAT
data). It is commonly admitted that rising yields have been driven by the widespread
use of irrigation, improved varieties and fertilizer use and that the low use of fertilizers
is responsible for the observed stagnation of yields in Africa (Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and
Byerlee, 2007). Indeed, the average intensity of fertilizer use is less than 10 kilograms
per hectare of cultivated land in Sub-Saharan Africa, while it is above 250 kilograms per
hectare of land in Eastern Asia (FAOSTAT data). Agronomic experimentations led in
Sub-Saharan African countries established a strong yield gap between observed yields in
the ﬁeld and measured yields in the stations, this gap being explained by the low use of
chemical fertilizers by farmers (Lobell, Cassman, and Field, 2009). This paper seeks to
understand why African farmers do not use more fertilizers to gain higher yields.
There is an extensive literature on agricultural technology adoption in developing coun-
tries that seeks to understand why farmers in some countries are reluctant to adopt
innovations while farmers in other countries are not. Regarding the low adoption of
chemical fertilizers in Africa, the most commonly advanced reasons are related to both
demand-side and supply-side factors. Demand for fertilizer can be hindered either be-
cause of high fertilizer prices, or low ability of farmers to raise the resources needed to
purchase fertilizer (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Ramaswani, 1992; Duﬂo et al., 2011).
On the supply side, fertilizer distribution may be discouraged by an unfavorable business
climate characterized by a small market size, high transportation costs and high cost of
ﬁnancing (Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, and Byerlee, 2007). Moreover, the fact that farmers
facing similar ﬁnancial constraints, market environments and agro-ecological conditions
diﬀer in fertilizer purchasing behavior suggests that diﬀerences in agricultural decisions
may also be explained by individual preferences. This paper investigates the importance
of risk and time preferences in agricultural behavior focusing on fertilizer use.
Behavioral considerations that may hinder fertilizer use have been recently highlighted
in the literature on technology adoption, borrowing elements from laboratory experi-
ments and behavioral economics (Fafchamps 2010). Those behavioral patterns may be
related to risk aversion (Sandmo, 1971; Binswanger and Sillers, 1983) and impatience
(Duﬂo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011). Risk aversion is often mentioned as a potentially
important contributing factor to under-investment in farming systems (Sandmo, 1971).
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The risk may be inherent to the technology itself, as it is the case in chemical fertilizers
where the use of fertilizer may increase variance of yields and variance of incomes net
of fertilizer costs (Just and Pope 1979; Roumasset, Rosegrant et al. 1989; Fafchamps
2010). Thus, if we consider a rational but risk adverse farmer, it is expected that more
risk adverse farmers will reduce their use of fertilizers. Binswanger was the ﬁrst author to
build upon experimental economics to elicit individual risk aversion and to try to explain
the low use of input among farmers (Binswanger, 1980). He compared the elicited levels
of risk aversion obtained in India (Binswanger, 1980) to those obtained through similar
experiments in the Philippines (Sillers 1980), El Salvador (Walker 1980) and Thailand
(Grisley 1980) and established that risk aversion levels were very close from one country
to one another and thus that risk aversion had a only limited power for explaining diﬀer-
ential investment behaviour (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). More recently, authors have
developed the idea that we should consider time preferences to better understand the
low use of fertilizers (Fafchamps, 2010; Duﬂo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011). Impatient
farmers are expected to use less quantities of fertilizers because they value higher a good
at an earlier date than at a later date. Applying fertilizers at the beginning of the crop
season and having to expect the harvest to have a return to investment or buying fer-
tilizer after harvest when there are no liquidity constraints to apply this fertilizer later,
may not be rational to impatient farmers. Besides being impatient, farmers may have
present biased preferences, meaning that they are more impatient with choices aﬀecting
current consumption than with choices aﬀecting future consumption. In Kenya, it has
been highlighted that farmers may plan to buy fertilizers but postpone the purchase of
fertilizer to a later period where they may be unable to do so because of "procrastina-
tion" (Duﬂo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011). Extremely impatient farmers are expected
not to purchase any unit of fertilizers, while moderately impatient farmers may purchase
or not fertilizers : - Farmers who are moderately impatient with about the same level of
impatience now and in the future are expected to purchase fertilizers : their individual
preferences are time consistent - Farmers who are more impatient with choices aﬀecting
consumption in the present than with choices that will play in the future may consume
too much and be unable to buy fertilizers in the future : their individual preferences are
time inconsistent. Thus the relation between impatience and fertilizers use is twofold :
impatient farmers are expected to use less quantities of fertilizers and impatient farmers
with present biased preferences are expected to use lesser quantities of fertilizers. Despite
those stimulating proposals, the eﬀect of time preferences on fertilizers use has not been
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empirically tested in the economic literature 1.
The contribution of this paper is to empirically investigate the relative inﬂuence of risk
and time individual preferences on fertilizer use, drawing upon an agricultural survey
and an experiment led in Burkina Faso. Standard practice in inter-temporal welfare
analyses is to assume that risk and time preferences are the same across farmers when
one would expect a priori that subjective time preferences diﬀer across diﬀerent indi-
viduals (Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor, 2010). We build upon very recent papers
from the ﬁeld experiment literature that aim at eliciting risk aversion coeﬃcients and
discount rates for individuals (Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 2002; Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstrom, 2008) and we relate farmers elicited preferences to their behaviors,
captured trough an original agricultural survey. There is a long tradition in development
economics of collecting original data on agricultural behavior in order to test a speciﬁc
economic hypothesis (Duﬂo, 2006). Recently, this literature based on agricultural surveys
has merged with an expertise in setting up ﬁeld experiments in order to elicit farmers'
individual preferences in developing countries. To date however, very few papers were
able to show that experimental choices correlate with observed agricultural behavior.
Yet, understanding such relationship - if there is any - is of importance for development
because it would help designing relevant development policies. Typically, very impatient
people may be reluctant to use development tools like saving products or microcredit
innovations.
A small number of studies aim to determine to what extent individual preferences
drive behaviors in developing countries. Liu and Huang (2013) established that risk
aversion -elicited trough an experiment led on 320 Chinese farmers- has an increasing
eﬀect on the use of pesticides. Besides this study on risk aversion, most of those stud-
ies that relate individual preferences to behaviors tend to focus on the relation between
present-biased preferences and the adoption of saving or credit innovations provided
through randomized control trials. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) asked hypothetical
time discounting questions to 1777 clients of a Philippine bank and show that women
who exhibited present-biased preferences were indeed signiﬁcantly more likely to open
1We found however three recent empirical studies dealing with the inﬂuence of time preferences
upon behaviors (not related to fertilizers use) that build upon both experiments and surveys. In India,
an experiment led on farmers established that farmers who had present biased preferences were more
keen to borrow money from micro-credit institutions (Bauer, Chytilová et al. 2012). This result is
consistent with similar results established in the context of USA where present biased preferences had
an increasing eﬀect on credit card borrowing (Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Similarly, in the Philippines,
it was established that people with present biased preferences were more reluctant to take up forced
saving contracts (Ashraf, Karlan et al. 2006)
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a savings account with restrict access. On the same line, Bauer, Chytilova, and Mor-
duch (2012) show from a random sample of 573 Indian villagers that, among women who
borrow, those with present-biased preferences are particularly likely to be microcredit
borrowers. Recently, Dupas and Robinson (2013) use data from a ﬁeld experiment in
Kenya in order to show that providing individuals with simple informal savings technolo-
gies can substantially increase investment in preventative health. Their results moreover
indicate that women who exhibit present-biased preferences do not beneﬁt from saving
product with easily access to the money while they do beneﬁt from the combination of
the stronger commitment to make regular contributions and credit provided by a group
setting (in this case, a Rotating Savings and Credit Association). All of these studies
conjecture from their results that time-inconsistency might be an important constraint
for saving, whether at home or in a self-help group with microcredit purpose. In par-
ticular, they suggest that if the present-biased individuals are sophisticated enough, they
will opt for commitment-saving mechanisms that allow them to save according to their
future plans and keep them from giving in to their immediate temptations.
This paper contributes to the literature that aims to highlight a link between elicited
individual preferences and observed agricultural decisions in several ways. First, we focus
on fertilizer use for crop production, while most previous studies have focused on credit
and saving products. Second, contrary to Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) and Dupas and
Robinson (2013) who study the impact of individual preferences on the participation to
a development program, we rather study current agricultural behavior of farmers. Third,
we provide evidence that a time-consistent model of discounting can explain variability
in fertilizer use. Duﬂo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) argue that even when facing small
ﬁxed costs of purchasing fertilizer, farmers may postpone fertilizer purchases until later
periods. When they have inconsistent time preferences, those farmers end up being im-
patient in the last period in which buying is possible and ﬁnally fail to invest in fertilizer.
We argue that even in cases when farmers are not ﬁnancially constrained and beneﬁt
from facilitated access to fertilizer, we can establish a causal link between the discount
rate and fertilizer use in a framework where farmers are time-consistent.
In the next section we model fertilizer investment decisions of a farmer who displays
time consistent preferences. The model predicts that the quantity of fertilizer used is
an increasing function of the discount rate and independent of risk aversion. Section 3
describes the sample, the experimental design for eliciting discount rates, risk aversion
coeﬃcients and the survey data. Section 4 shows how the experimental choices correlate
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with observed fertilizer use behavior and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Fertilizer Use
2.1 No uncertainty
We consider the inter-temporal decision of a farmer who produces maize. A typical year
is divided into two periods: the harvest season and the lean season. At the harvest sea-
son, the farmer gets its production ft, consumes ft − st ≥ 0 and keeps st up to the lean
season. At the harvest season, the price of cereals is p. There is thus no uncertainty on
crop prices nor on harvest levels. This assumption is left aside later.
At the lean season, the farmer buys (and uses) a quantity xt of fertilizers at unit
price b. He consumes the remaining value of his harvest, pst − wxt ≥ 0, where p is the
price of cereals at the lean season. The production ft increases with the quantity of
fertilizers used, xt−1. Formally, ft ≡ f (xt−1) and f ′ > 0 (we also assume f ′′ ≤ 0). In
our framework, the farmer has no access to credit and cannot store any valuable goods
between the lean season and the next harvest season, meaning that the whole harvested
quantity is supposed to be self-consumed or sold before the next harvest season.
The price of cereals usually increase from the harvest season to the lean season, and
then we assume that p > p. Let u denotes the utility function of the farmer (with u′ > 0
and u′′ ≤ 0) and √ρ denotes the discount factor between two seasons (from harvest to
lean or from lean to harvest). Starting from the harvest season of year t, the discounted
sum of utility of the farmer is given by
Ut =
+∞∑
d=t
ρ
d−t
2 u
(
p (f (xd−1)− sd)
)
+ ρ
d−t+1
2 u (psd − bxd)
The farmer chooses the quantities of fertilizer, xt, and the stocks, st, for all t, that max-
imizes his discounted sum of utility.
The necessary conditions for an interior solution (xt > 0, st > 0, ft − st > 0,
pst − wxt > 0) are:
−pu′ (p (f (xt−1)− st))+ p√ρu′ (pst − bxt) = 0,
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and,
−bu′ (pst − bxt) + pf ′ (xt)√ρu′
(
p (f (xt)− st+1)
)
= 0.
Let us focus on the stationary solution, i.e. xt = x and st = s. The necessary conditions
become:
u′ (ps− bx)
pu′
(
p (f (x)− s)) = 1√ρp,
and, √
ρf ′ (x)
b
=
u′ (ps− bx)
pu′
(
p (f (x)− s))
Hence, we must have
f ′ (x) =
b
ρp
or,
x = f ′−1
(
b
ρp
)
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The model thus shows that the quantity of fertilizers:
• is a decreasing function of the price of fertilizers, b.
• is an increasing function of the annual discount factor (patience), ρ.
• is an increasing function of the price of cereals at the lean season, p.
• does not depend on the utility function, u. Hence, it does not depend on risk
aversion.
• does not depend on the price of cereals at the harvest season, p.
2.2 Price and harvest uncertainty
Assume that, at the time of the harvest season, the price of cereals in the lean season is
unknown. It is distributed according to cumulative distribution H. At the time of the
lean season, future harvest is also not perfectly known. We assume that the harvest is
γf , where γ is distributed according to cumulative distribution G.
At the harvest season of year t, the harvest γf (xt−1) is known. The farmer chooses
st that maximizes:
Ut =
+∞∑
d=t
ρ
d−t
2 u
(
p (γf (xd−1)− sd)
)
+ ρ
d−t+1
2
∫
u (psd − bxd) dH (p)
The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
pu′
(
p (γf (xd−1)− sd)
)
=
√
ρ
∫
pu′ (psd − bxd) dH (p)
At the lean season of year t, the price is known, it is p. The farmer chooses xt that
maximizes:
Ut =
+∞∑
d=t
ρ
d−t
2 u (psd − bxd) + ρ
d−t+1
2
∫
u
(
p (γf (xd)− sd+1)
)
dG (γ)
The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
bu′ (pst − bxt) = √ρpf ′ (xt)
∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt)− st+1)
)
dG (γ)
8
The two ﬁrst order conditions can be rewritten as follows:
p
∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt−1)− st)
)
dG (γ) = E (γ)
√
ρ
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p) ,
and,
b
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p) = E (p)√ρpf ′ (xt)
∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt)− st+1)
)
dG (γ)
or,
p
E (γ)
√
ρ
=
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p)∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt−1)− st)
)
dG (γ)
,
and,
f ′ (xt−1) =
b
E (p)
√
ρp
∫
pu′ (pst − bxt) dH (p)∫
γu′
(
p (γf (xt)− st+1)
)
dG (γ)
Let us focus on the stationary solution. The stationary quantity of fertilizer is given
x = f ′−1
(
b
E (γ)E (p) ρ
)
,
for all t.
The quantity of fertilizers:
• is a decreasing function of the price of fertilizers, b.
• is an increasing function of the annual discount factor (patience), ρ.
• is an increasing function of the expected price of cereals at the lean season, E (p).
• is an increasing function of the expected "yield", E (γ).
• does not depend on the utility function, u. Hence, it does not depend on risk
aversion.
• does not depend on the price of cereals at the harvest season, p.
3 Experimental and Survey Design
The survey design generated a representative sample of farmers in two administrative
districts of Burkina Faso, Tuy and Mouhoun provinces. Those provinces are located in
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the west region of the country, which is the main maize production area. Data were col-
lected in January 2013 in cooperation with the Confédération Paysanne du Faso (CPF), a
nation-wide farmers' organization. A total number of 77 villages were randomly selected
from the CPF list. In those villages, an average number of 20 households were randomly
selected as well. With the help of the Burkinabe Agriculture Ministry, twenty investiga-
tors and two supervisors were recruited. A total number of 1549 farmers were surveyed
between January 21, 2013 and February 7, 2013. Surveys were conducted in Dioula
language. The survey included an experimental section aimed at eliciting risk and time
preferences and a household survey part aimed at characterizing households and farm-
ing decisions. The total survey lasted around one hour per farmer. We interviewed the
household head, deﬁned as the person responsible for farming decisions.
3.1 Household survey
The household survey was made of nine distinct sections: (i) socio-economic characteris-
tics of the household and of the household's head; (ii) household's economic assets; (iii)
crop production; (iv) crop sales; (v) fertilizer expenses: (vi) non agricultural activities un-
dertaken by the household members; (vii) household's social expenses; (viii) household's
loans and (ix) household's food expenses. The summary statistics at the household level
are presented in Table 1. On average, surveyed households have 13 members, 7 being
working with farming activities. In our sample, 30% of households are equipped with
latrines and with sheet metal roof in 70% of cases. Households hold an average of 5 bikes,
1 motorbike and 2 heads of draft cattle. In the majority of the cases, the household is
headed by a man, who is 43 years old on average, has received a written education in 40%
of cases and is very often member of a farmer organization (85% of cases), whatsoever
CPF or another organization.
In the regions were surveys were conducted, main crops are cotton, maize, sorghum,
millet and sesame. Millet and sorghum are traditionally consumed, while maize and
sesame are sold as well. This is reﬂected in the average sown areas and in the produc-
tion levels in the sample (Table 1). Average yields are of 1.1 ton per ha for cotton, 1.5
ton per ha for maize and respectively 0.8 and 0.7 per ha for sorghum and millet. The
diﬀerence in cereal yields is likely to result from diﬀerent fertilizer uses. Many farmers
indeed use fertilizer for maize production, which is not the case for other cereals. The
average quantity of fertilizer used for maize production - 238 kg per ha - hides a quite
high heterogeneity among sampled farmers, as quarter of the sample does not use any
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Table 1: Sample characteristics
Household's characteristics unit Obs. mean std. dev.
family size number 1549 12.7 8.8
labor force number 1549 7.1 5.4
latrine yes=1, no=0 1549 0.32 0.46
roof quality yes=1, no=0 1549 0.69 0.46
bike number 1549 4.9 4.2
motorbike number 1549 0.95 1.13
draft cattle number 1549 2.4 2.54
sex yes=male 1549 0.98 0.13
age years 1549 42.9 12.7
education yes=1, no=0 1549 0.39 0.49
producer organization yes=1, no=0 1549 0.85 0.35
Cultivated areas
cotton ha 1549 3.95 4.61
maize ha 1549 2.06 3.28
sorghum ha 1549 1.84 2.2
millet ha 1549 0.89 1.55
sesame ha 1549 0.5 1.07
Production levels
cotton kg 1543 4454 10867
maize kg 1545 3624 7100
sorghum kg 1546 1340 1953
millet kg 1547 544 1002
sesame kg 1540 105 262
Yield levels
cotton kg per ha 1218 1145 2145
maize kg per ha 1273 1543 1269
sorghum kg per ha 1212 819 1529
millet kg per ha 796 700 1077
sesame kg per ha 600 239 323
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fertilizer for maize production.
The fertilizers used by the sampled farmers come from various sources, most farmers
using fertilizers they receive from the ﬁrm that buys their cotton production, the cotton
marketing board. In Burkina Faso, cotton is indeed a vertically integrated sector, where
producers are ensured to sell their production at the end of the season and to receive
fertilizers at the beginning of the season. The amount of fertilizers they receive is linked
to the cotton surface they declare to cultivate. Fertilizer costs are deducted from the
price they receive at the end of the season. The maize sector is much less integrated
and maize producers do not have a speciﬁc mechanism to facilitate them fertilizer access,
although there are stores in the area. In the absence of such a fertilizer delivery scheme,
farmers strategy tend to be the diversion of part of the cotton fertilizer package that they
receive from the marketing board, in order to apply fertilizer in their maize ﬁelds. This
is a risky strategy, as cotton yields are likely to be lower and this may in turn arouse
suspicion from the marketing board. Thus we expect that more risk adverse farmers will
not fully follow this strategy. We take this into account in our empirical estimations.
3.2 Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences
In order to elicit farmers' risk and time preferences, we use an artefactual ﬁeld experi-
ment in the terminology of Harrison and List (2004). We asked hypothetical risk aversion
and time discounting questions. The experiment oﬀered farmers lotteries of risky and
safe options to elicit their risk aversion and sets of choices between present and future
consumption options to elicit their discount factor. If most ﬁeld experiments have been
led in developed countries (Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 2002; Andersen, Harrison, Lau,
and Rutstrom, 2008), the use of experiments in developing countries has recently re-
ceived a great deal of attention (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008; Duﬂo, 2006; Harrison,
Lau, and Williams, 2002). Contributions include experiments in Ethiopia, India and
Uganda (Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004), in Zimbabwe (Barr and Genicot, 2008) and
in Vietnam (Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen, 2010). Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002)
elicit individual discount rates from a nationally representative sample of 268 Danish
people. Using a sample of 253 Danish people as well, Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and
Rutstrom (2008) make a joint elicitation of both discount rates and risk aversion coeﬃ-
cients, such approach providing lower estimates of discount rates compared to previous
studies. Focusing on developing countries, Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor (2010)
use data collected from risky choice experiments in Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Tanaka,
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Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) collect data from sample of 160 Vietnamese villagers and
show that people living in wealthy villages are not only less risk averse but also more
patient.
3.2.1 Risk aversion
Our experiments were built on the risk aversion experiments of Holt and Laury (2002).
We used a multiple price list design to measure individual risk preferences. We ran two
experiments oﬀering successively low and high payoﬀs. In each experiment, each partic-
ipant was presented a choice between two lotteries of risky and safe options, and this
choice was repeated nine times with diﬀerent pairs of lotteries, as illustrated in Table 2
in the case of low pay-oﬀs. Farmers were asked to choose either lottery A or lottery B
at each game (a game is a row in the table). The ﬁrst row of Table 2 indicates that
lottery A oﬀers a 10% probability of receiving 1000 FCFA and a 90% probability of re-
ceiving 800 FCFA, while lottery B oﬀers a 10% probability of a 1925 FCFA payoﬀ and a
90% probability of 50 FCFA payoﬀ.
Low payoﬀs were chosen because they ﬁtted previous experiments of Holt and Laury
(2002) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008) and because they amount
to approximately one day income for a non skilled worker in Burkina Faso (around
1000 FCFA a day, ie 2 USD a day). In the second experiment, farmers were asked to
choose between lotteries with 10 times higher payoﬀs. The oﬀered payoﬀs were corre-
sponding to an important amount of money, 10000 FCFA (around 20 USD) corresponding
to the average price of one bag of 100 kg cereal after harvest or to 10 days income for a
non skilled worker.
In practice, lotteries A and B were materialized by two bags containing 10 balls of
diﬀerent colors (green for 1000 FCFA, blue for 800 FCFA, black for 1920 FCFA and
transparent for 50 FCFA). The composition of the bags was revealed to the farmers but
they had to choose between picking a ball in bag A or bag B without seeing the balls
(blind draw). As indicated in last column of Table 2, neutral risk adverse individuals
(r around zero) are expected to switch from lottery A to lottery B at row 5, while risk
loving individuals (r < 0) are expected to switch to lottery B before row 5 and risk
adverse individuals (r > 0) are expected to switch to lottery B after row 5.
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Table 2: The paired lottery-choice decisions with low payoﬀs
lottery A lottery B
prob 1 gain 1 prob 2 gain 2 | prob 3 gain 3 prob 4 gain 4 range of r
1 0.1 1000 0.9 800 | 0.1 1925 0.9 50 −∞ -1.71
2 0.2 1000 0.8 800 | 0.2 1925 0.8 50 -1.71 -0.95
3 0.3 1000 0.7 800 | 0.3 1925 0.7 50 -0.95 -0.49
4 0.4 1000 0.6 800 | 0.4 1925 0.6 50 -0.49 -0.14
5 0.5 1000 0.5 800 | 0.5 1925 0.5 50 -0.14 0.15
6 0.6 1000 0.4 800 | 0.6 1925 0.4 50 0.15 0.41
7 0.7 1000 0.3 800 | 0.7 1925 0.3 50 0.41 0.68
8 0.8 1000 0.2 800 | 0.8 1925 0.2 50 0.68 0.97
9 0.9 1000 0.1 800 | 0.9 1925 0.1 50 0.97 1.37
10 1 1000 0 800 | 1 1925 0 50 1.37 +∞
Note: Last column was not shown to respondents.
Since all lottery choices are in the gain domain, we assume a utility function of the
following form:
U(x) = x1−r/(1− r)
where x is the lottery prize and r is the parameter to be estimated and denotes risk
aversion. Expected utility is the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each
row. A farmer is indiﬀerent between lottery A (probability pA to earn a ; probability
1− pA to earn b) and lottery B (probability pB to earn c and probability 1− pB to earn
d), if and only if his expected utility is the same in both lotteries:
pA.U(a) + (1− pA).U(b) = pB.U(c) + (1− pB).U(d)
Assuming a CRRA (Constant relative Risk Aversion) utility function,
pA.
a1−r
1− r + (1− pA)
b1−r
1− r = pB.
c1−r
1− r + (1− pB)
d1−r
1− r
which can be solved numerically in term of r.
Just as in Holt and Laury (2002) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008),
we allow risk aversion to be a linear function of the observed households' characteristics.
We consider six characteristics that we assumed unambiguously exogenous in driving risk
preferences: gender, age, family size, education, village, province. Estimated individual
r coeﬃcients are predicted values of the model, which we estimate using an interval re-
gression (tobit model). Figure1 displays the distribution of the risk coeﬃcients predicted
14
from the low-payoﬀ experiment. Results show that a minority of farmers exhibit a risk
loving or risk neutrality behavior. Most of the farmers are risk adverse, with an average
of r = 0.69 in the low-payoﬀ experiment and r = 0.63 in the high-payoﬀ experiment.
This is in line with previous ﬁndings suggesting that farmers' preference for risk is quite
low (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). Those average values are comparable to the ones
obtained by Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor (2010) for India, Ethiopia and Uganda
using similar experiments.
Figure 1: Estimated risk aversion coeﬃcients (low payoﬀs)
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3.2.2 Discount Rate
To our knowledge, there is no study that aim to elicit discount rates in developing coun-
tries. We thus built our time preference experiment on works of Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) and of Coller and Williams (1999). However we had to adapt the con-
tent in order to present pay-oﬀs that make sense to the respondents. To do so, we ran
pre-tests of the experiment from a subset of farmers before the survey. We used two
experiments to elicit farmers' time preferences, those experiments diﬀering in the time
delays oﬀered to the farmers. In the ﬁrst experiment, farmers were invited to choose be-
tween receiving a given amount in one day time (option A) or receiving a bigger amount
in ﬁve-days time (option B), and this choice had been repeated nine times, with diﬀerent
payoﬀs. The amount of payment A corresponds to the average price of one bag of 100 kg
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Table 3: Would you prefer to get A in one day or B in ﬁve days?
A B range of δ (4 days)
1 10000 10400 0 0.016
2 10000 10700 0.016 0.027
3 10000 11000 0.027 0.039
4 10000 11500 0.039 0.057
5 10000 12000 0.057 0.076
6 10000 13000 0.076 0.111
7 10000 14000 0.111 0.144
8 10000 17000 0.144 0.236
9 10000 20000 0.236 0.320
Note: Range of δ indicates the as-
sociated interval for monthly δ for
a respondent who switches from A
to B.
of cereals after harvest. Table 3 displays the experiment aiming to elicit this discount
rate that we call current discount rate hereafter. The ﬁrst row of Table 3 indicates that
farmer had to choose between receiving 10,000 FCFA tomorrow or 10,400 FCFA in ﬁve
days.
In a second experiment, farmers were invited to choose between receiving a given
amount in one month-time (option A) or receiving a bigger amount in two-months time
(option B), and this choice being repeated eight times, with diﬀerent payoﬀs. Table 4
displays the experiment aiming to elicit this discount rate that we call future discount
rate hereafter.
An agent is indiﬀerent between receiving payment Mt at time t or payment Mt+1 at
time t+ 1 if and only if:
U(w +Mt) +
1
1 + δ
U(w) = U(w) +
1
1 + δ
U(w +Mt+1)
where w is his background consumption and δ accounts for the discount rate which is
the parameter to be estimated. Assuming again a CRRA utility function and assuming
no background consumption, this writes:
M1−rt
1− r =
1
1 + δ
M1−rt+1
1− r ,
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Table 4: Would you prefer to get A in one month or B in two months?
A B range of δ
1 10000 12000 0 0.06
2 10000 15000 0.06 0.13
3 10000 18000 0.13 0.19
4 10000 20000 0.19 0.23
5 10000 23000 0.23 0.28
6 10000 29000 0.28 0.38
7 10000 48000 0.38 0.60
8 10000 75000 0.60 0.83
Note: Range of δ indicates the as-
sociated interval for monthly δ for
a respondent who switches from A
to B.
from which we get δ as a function of risk aversion r:
δ =
[
Mt+1
Mt
]1−r
− 1
Here again we allow δ to be a linear function of exogenous covariates. Estimated indi-
vidual δ coeﬃcients are predicted values of the model that we also use in order to elicit
individual r, which we estimate again using an interval regression. Figure2 displays the
estimated current discount rates.
4 Elicited Impatience and Observed Fertilizer Use
We now aim to estimate the fertilizer demand in accordance with the theoretical model
presented in Section 2. In the empirical model, the quantity of fertilizer used is a variable
which measures the total quantity of plant nutrients used. Fertilizer products includes
nitrogenous, potash, phosphate, and urea. Nitrogenous, potash and phosphate elements
are applied together with the use of NPK bags. Urea is applied separately. We thus
estimate separately the demand for NPK and the demand for urea. The farmer's im-
patience is measured by δ and risk aversion is measured by r. We moreover control for
prices by adding dummies for municipalities.2 We proxy household capital through the
number of bovines and plows, and labor force is measured through the number of people
2Municipalities are administrative areas that are larger than villages and smaller than provinces, and
that we believe relevant to catch spatial price variability in the studied area.
17
Figure 2: Estimated current discount rates
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in the family who work in farm activities. Finally, we control for the fact that farmers
may produce cotton and for the fact that farmers may have a speciﬁc access to credit to
ﬁnance fertilizers, in order to take into account that some farmers have facilitated access
to fertilizer through the cotton marketing board or through credit:
yi = β0 + β1δi + β1ri + β3Xi + i
where i ∼ N(0, σ) and X includes control variables.
We argue that no selection bias problem can arise in this framework because farmers
who use fertilizer for maize production diﬀer from farmers who do not in characteristics
that are observable to us. Applying OLS to the empirical model thus yields unbiased
estimates of βs. Results on NPK and urea use are presented in the following subsections.
Overall, results show that risk aversion does not aﬀect fertilizer use, which is in line with
the theoretical model; and that discounting does signiﬁcantly decrease fertilizer use.
4.1 Time discounting and npk use
Results on the eﬀect of risk and time preferences on NPK use are presented below. Four
speciﬁcations are presented, according to the variables used for risk aversion (r elicited
with low or high payoﬀs) and for discounting (δ elicited for present choices or future
18
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for sample used in the regression
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Unit
Qty of fertilizer 286.1 463.1 0 5800 kg per ha
cattle size 8.4 18.8 0 443 nb
plows 0.86 0.64 0 4 nb
workers 7.6 5.5 1 45 nb
total area 10.9 9.2 .12 88.5 ha
cotton area 4.4 4.8 0 45 ha
r (low payoﬀs) 0.72 0.64 -3.2 3.25 none
r (high payoﬀs) 0.66 0.73 -3.06 4.14 none
δ (future choices) .21 .25 -.6 1.03 none
δ (present choices) .17 .16 -.88 .8 none
Note: δ (future choices) are monthly values.
δ (present choices) have been computed as
monthly values for sake of comparison.
choices).
If we consider the two proxies used for household capital, we ﬁnd that the number of
cattle held by the household has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the application of npk fertilizer
while the number of plows has a positive eﬀect on the use of npk fertilizer on maize pro-
duction. This indicates that cattle breeding and maize intensiﬁcation are not necessarily
complementarity activities and that applying more npk fertilizer goes with having more
plows which is somehow intuitive. Similarly, the number of workers has a positive ef-
fect on the used of npk, indicating that labor intensiﬁcation is compatible with chemical
intensiﬁcation. The fact to produce cotton has a positive eﬀect on npk use, this eﬀect
being explained that when producing cotton farmers receive fertilizers packages and that
they may use part of those fertilizers to apply within their maize plots. Surprisingly,
credit access has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on npk used : this reﬂects that the most common
strategy to ensure npk access is to deﬂect part of the chemical packages they receive from
cotton marketing boards. Risk aversion has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on npk use in 3 of the 4
speciﬁcations, which is consistent with what was predicted by the model. Impatience has
a negative eﬀect on npk use : the more impatient are farmers, the less they apply npk in
their maize plots. This eﬀect of time discounting is consistent with what was expected
by the model and is robust to all the empirical speciﬁcations we have been testing. The
size of the time discounting coeﬃcient is higher when considering future choices than
present choices, but this is compensated by the fact that discount rates vary in a ratio
of 1 to 5 for present choices (the mean being 1.11) and future choices (the mean being
0.21).
19
Table 6: Time discounting and NPK use-OLS estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
cattle size 4.040245 4.004037 4.027191 3.992887
(1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.28)
plows 73.2563 *** 73.21261 *** 73.65294 *** 73.59564
(4.33) (4.37) (4.36) (4.40)
workers 19.8997 *** 19.41755 *** 20.0509 *** 19.59882
(3.63) (3.51) (3.63) (3.52)
cotton producer 79.91614 * 80.54533 * 83.37103 * 83.86923
(1.86) (1.88) (1.92) (1.93)
credit access -13.92188 -19.05117 -14.73758 -19.84113
(-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.32) (-0.42)
r 41.519 41.90424 * 27.91937 28.80172
(1.52) (1.81) (1.16) (1.33)
δ -29.92941 ** -160.1178 *** -28.60701 ** -154.9424
(-2.20) (-2.93) (-2.04) (-2.58)
constant -137.1421 -153.4081 -127.6782 -143.5267
(-1.57) (-2.07) (-1.50) (-1.95)
communal dummies Yes yes yes yes
payoﬀs ( r ) low low high high
time frame (δ) present future present future
obs 1271 1271 1271 1271
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4.2 Time discounting and urea use
Results on the eﬀect of risk and time preferences on urea use are presented below. Just
as it was the case for NPK estimations, four speciﬁcations are presented, according to the
variables used for risk aversion (r elicited with low or high payoﬀs) and for discounting
(δ elicited for present choices or future choices).
Table 7: Time discounting and urea use-OLS estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
cattle size 1.260921 1.244226 1.255213 1.239174
(1.20) (1.20) (1.20) (1.20)
plows 33.22543 *** 33.15072 *** 33.4136 *** 33.33568 ***
(4.19) (4.21) (4.15) (4.18)
workers 10.6995 *** 10.48062 *** 10.79783 *** 10.59765 ***
(4.86) (4.68) (4.88) (4.71)
cotton producer 35.59481 * 35.4664 * 37.27554 ** 37.13041 **
(1.93) (1.92) (2.01) (2.01)
credit access 2.824796 -.2753378 2.278924 -.8887407
(0.14) (-0.01) (0.11) (-0.04)
r 22.28626 * 23.46025 * 16.12034 17.48495 *
(1.67) (1.95) (1.55) (1.82)
delta -13.8006 ** -81.88903 ** -13.35164 ** -80.53556 **
(-2.09) (-2.23) (-2.10) (-2.21)
constant -63.6481 -70.38646 -59.64403 -66.34171
(-1.40) (-1.75) (-1.40) (-1.76)
communal dummies yes yes yes yes
payoﬀs ( r ) low low high high
time frame (delta) present future present future
obs 1271 1271 1271 1271
The obtained results are very much similar with the ones obtained for NPK use.
Impatience negatively aﬀects urea application, this eﬀect being robust to the diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. However, we ﬁnd that risk aversion increases urea use in 3 of the 4
speciﬁcations (see Table ??).
4.3 Hyperbolic discounting and npk use
In this subsection we investigate the role of hyperbolic discounting on fertilizer use.
Some farmers may be more impatient about present choices than future choices and may
present present biased preferences. Similarly, farmers may be more impatient about fu-
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ture choices than present choices and in this case may have future biased preferences.
To empirically assess the inﬂuence of time inconsistencies we compare farmers' answers
regarding present choices and future choices. We interpret their choices as being present
biased if the inferred current discount rate is larger than the future discount rate. We
further distinguish between individuals with 'weakly present biased preferences' and 'ex-
tremely present biased preferences' just as in Bauer, Chytilova, and Morduch (2012).
Weakly present biased preferences are represented one cell below the diagonal in Table 8,
while extremely present biased preferences are represented in the lower left cells of Ta-
ble 8. Similarly, we interpret choices as being future biased if the inferred future discount
rate is higher than the current discount rate : those choices are represented in the upper
right cells of Table 8.
Table 8: Distribution of discount rates inferred from responses to time preferences ques-
tions
Future discount rate
Patient Impatient
0<d<0.3 0.3<d<0.48 0.48<d<1.1 d>1.1 Total
Patient 0<d<0.3 574 20 9 20 623
37% 1% 1% 1% 40%
0.3<d<0.48 45 6 1 0 52
Current 3% 0% 0% 0% 3%
discount 0.48<d<1.1 140 60 4 4 208
rate 9% 4% 0% 0% 13%
Impatient d>1.1 151 102 68 345 666
10% 7% 4% 22% 43%
Total 910 188 82 369 1549
59% 12% 5% 24% 100%
The distribution of current and future discount rates establishes that 25 per cent
of the answers correspond to extremely present biased preferences and that 11 per cent
correspond to weakly present biased preferences. In contrast, only 3 per cent of the
received answers are from farmers who are more patient now than in the future. Roughly
one third of the sampling has present biased preferences while future biased preferences
are rather unusual: these proportions are similar to those found by Bauer, Chytilova,
and Morduch (2012) in India, by Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) in the Philippines and
by Meier and Sprenger (2010) in the United States.
The inﬂuence of time inconsistent preferences on NPK fertilizer use is empirically
tested, after controlling for household capital, labor, access to NPK fertilizer, risk aver-
22
sion, impatience and price levels (see Table 9).
Table 9: Time inconsistent preferences and NPK use
[1] [2] [3] [4]
cattle size 4.072672 4.040756 4.061305 4.031114
(1.30) (1.30) (1.30) (1.30)
plows 73.21115 *** 73.19685 *** 73.56761 *** 73.54026 ***
(4.35) (4.40) (4.38) (4.43)
workers 19.91563 *** 19.45313 *** 20.05229 *** 19.62461 ***
(3.64) (3.53) (3.63) (3.53)
cotton producer 78.03802 * 77.99829 * 81.2194 * 81.10226 *
(1.84) (1.84) (1.90) (1.89)
credit access -15.7315 -21.41572 -16.49976 -22.18664
(-0.36) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.49)
r 38.11211 39.25514 * 25.3343 26.89579
(1.41) (1.71) (1.07) (1.26)
delta -28.55765 ** -160.4902 *** -27.27192 ** -155.5166 ***
(-2.15) (-2.99) (-2.00) (-2.66)
strong present bias -56.68419 ** -59.69779 ** -58.02057 ** -60.9123 **
(-2.25) (-2.34) (-2.32) (-2.41)
weak present bias -34.80298 -34.75081 -34.96375 -34.76312
(-1.07) (-1.06) (-1.10) (-1.08)
future bias -2.446388 9.7621 -4.369148 7.274019
(-0.05) (0.22) (-0.10) (0.16)
constant -109.7794 -123.7685 -100.199 -113.8408
(-1.22) (-1.64) (-1.15) (-1.53)
communal dummies yes yes yes yes
payoﬀs ( r ) low low high high
time frame (delta) present future present future
obs 1271 1271 1271 1271
We ﬁnd that farmers having extremely present biased preferences are less likely to
use NPK in their maize plots. This eﬀect is robust to the four empirical speciﬁcations
led, and is additional to the eﬀect of impatience that is still highly signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusion
The textbook model of optimal fertilizer consumption choice tells that impatience de-
creases fertilizer use. Standard practice in inter-temporal welfare analyses is to assume
that time preferences are the same across farmers when one would expect a priori that
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subjective time preferences diﬀer across diﬀerent individuals. In this paper we elicit
discount rates for individuals. Taking into account individual ﬁnancial constraints and
access to fertilizer for maize production, we moreover show that experimental choices
correlate with observed fertilizer use behavior. This result is in line with prediction of
the textbook model of optimal fertilizer consumption choice made by farmers.
This paper presents one of the the ﬁrst ﬁeld evidence that links hypothetical time
discount questions to observed agricultural decisions. It contributes to the economic
literature in several ways. First, we focus on fertilizer use for crop production, while
previous studies have focused on saving products. Second, contrary to Ashraf, Karlan,
and Yin (2006) and Dupas and Robinson (2013) who study the impact of individual
preferences on the participation to a development program, we rather study current
agricultural behavior of farmers. Third, contrary to studies that focus on self-discipline
problems that farmers may face when they make farming decisions, we provide evidence
that discounting can explain variability in fertilizer use. We argue that even in cases when
farmers are not ﬁnancially constrained and beneﬁt from facilitated access to fertilizer, we
can establish a causal link between the discount rate and fertilizer use. This result stands
in a framework where farmers are time-consistent as in a framework where farmers have
present biased preferences.
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